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Places, People, Media, Creativity, Communication, Technology, Design

Archive for the 'Magpie' Category

A collection of snippets from the web and elsewhere gathered for myself and others.

Gitte’s references

Posted by Elizabeth Churchill on June 16, 2005

THANKS for these Gitte - excellent list of references, I want to read several papers right now!

Arthur, Brian
2002 Is the Information Revolution Dead? Business 2.0. March 2002:65-72.
2003 Why Tech Is Still the Future. Fortune Magazine, Monday, Nov. 24.

Baba, M. L., J. Gluesing, H. Ratner, and K. H. Wagner. 2004. The Context of Knowing: Natural History of a Globally Distributed Team. Journal of Organizational Behavior. 25(5), 547-587. (GDT)

Cramton, Catherine Durnell
2002 Attribution in Distributed Work Groups. Pp. 191-212 in Distributed Work, Pamela Hinds and Sara Kiesler, eds. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

Davey, Theresa, Anastasia Envall, Mark Gernerd, Tiffanne Mahomes, Maria Monroe, Jenna Nowak, Matthew Patricoski, Jacob Weiler
2005 Instant Messaging: Functions of a New Communicative Tool. www.nd.edu/~sblum/Instant Messaging.pdf. [Very interesting paper written by a group of students in an anthro class at Notre Dame University]

David, Ken and J. R. Lloyd
2003 Tools for organizational learning and organizational teaching: Learning and communicating about collaboration in dispersed engineering design projects.” Chapter 21 of Field Book in Collaborative Work Systems, G. Klein and J. Nemiro, eds. Center for the Study of Work Teams, University of North Texas. Jossey-Bass.

Gibson, Cristina B. and Susan G. Cohen, eds.
2003 Virtual Teams that Work: Creating Conditions for Virtual Team Effectiveness. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass

Grinter, Rebecca, James D. Herbsleb and Dewayne E. Perry
1999 The Geography of Coordination: Dealing with Distance in R&D Work. GROUP 99: 306-

Herbsleb, James D. and Rebecca E. Grinter
1998 Conceptual Simplicity Meets Organizational Complexity: Case Study of a Corporate Metrics Program. In Proceedings of the 20th International Conference on Software Engineering. Pp. 271-280. Kyoto, Japan: IEEE.

Herbsleb on attribution

Herbsleb and Grinter
1999,
2002

Hind, Pamela and Sara Kiesler, eds.
2002 Distributed Work. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

Hine, Christine
2000 Virtual Ethnography. London: SAGE.

Jones, Steve., ed.
1999 Doing Internet Research: Critical Issues and Methods for Examining the Net. Thousand Oaks, CA: SAGE Publications.

Jordan on learning and work

Jordan on diffusion?

Kiesler and Cummings
2002 in Distributed Work, Pamela Hinds and Sara Kiesler, eds.

Kitchin, Rob
1998 Cyberspace: The World in Wires. John Wiley & Sons Ltd.

Kraut et al
2002 in Distributed Work, Pamela Hinds and Sara Kiesler, eds.

Mannix, Elizabeth, Terri Griffith and Margaret Neale
2002 The Phenomenology of Conflict in Distributed Work Teams. p. 212- 233 in Distributed Work, Pamela Hinds and Sara Kiesler, eds.

Mason, Bruce
2003 Issues in Virtual Ethnography. In: Ethnographic Studies in Real and Virtual Environments: Inhabited Information Spaces and Connected Communities. Proceedings of 1999 Esprit i3 Workshop on Ethnographic Studies, K. Buckner, ed.

Nardi
2002 in Distributed Work, Pamela Hinds and Sara Kiesler, eds.

Olson et al
2002 in Distributed Work, Pamela Hinds and Sara Kiesler, eds.

Ruhleder, Karen and Brigitte Jordan
2001 Co-Constructing Non-Mutual Realities: Delay-Generated Trouble in Distributed Interaction. Journal of Computer Supported Cooperative Work 10:1:113-138.

Suchman on learning + work

Walther on attribution

Wasson, Christina
2004 Multitasking in Virtual Meetings. Human Resource Planning 27(4):47-60.

Weisband, Susan: Maintaining Awareness in Distributed Team Collaboration: Implications for Leadership and Performance. Pp. 311-333 in Distributed Work, Pamela Hinds and Sara Kiesler, eds.

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Gitte’s snippet from Churchill and Bly

Posted by Elizabeth Churchill on June 15, 2005

Churchill, Elizabeth F. and Sara Bly
2000 Culture Vultures: Considering Culture and Communication in Virtual Environments. In SIGGroup Bulletin, Volume 21, Number 1, April 2000. ACM Press, pp 6-11.

Cannibalized for EPIC by gj 050615:

We define culture in the broadest sense, to be a set of understandings that are shared with others. MUDders have a shared culture of work — a set of common understandings about what their work involves, and about what kinds of things their working lives tend to be about.

4.1 Methodologies for observing online life
So what are the appropriate methodologies for gaining a deeper understanding of the lifecycle and daily life of online cultures? What analyses can we carry out to get at the development and maintenance of Geertz’s shared “webs of significance” in on-line cultures? How can we begin to understand issues that arise in multi-cultural on-line worlds and what mechanisms there are for negotiation and discussion? How can we begin to understand where online cultures intersect with the cultures of the material world(s) in which individuals live their daily, material lives? What are methods for unpacking those social understandings both on-line and off-line? How do we gain an understanding of the intersecting cultural influences on an individual and on groups if we do not have access to the totality of their material and virtual worlds?

… In the context of virtual environments, what does it mean to design from the interaction out? How can we achieve meaningful descriptions that consider people’s intersecting identities and desires, on-line and off-line? If we are, as Geertz suggests to gain deeper understandings, we need “thick descriptions” in these virtual environments. How can this be achieved? How can we being to understand the dynamic and slow evolution of virtual cultures and climates? Considerable work on virtual communities has used interviews and surveys as a means of establishing who is talking to whom, for how long and about what. Much of this work has been carried out on intra-organizational networks looking at logs and messages [20], and in virtual worlds like lambdaMOO [e.g., 19].

…This raises a clear question about research on cultures and communities: are we to see online cultures as being made up of people who interact regularly with each other using multiple forms of communication technology (e.g., instant messengers, virtual worlds, email, etc.) with the focus on the people, or are we tacitly or explicitly concerned with having a technology focus whereupon we concentrate our efforts on the interactions that take place within one genre of technology?

In accord with Rossman and Wilson [18] we argue for a “shameless eclecticism” in approaches, involving online and offline ethnographic descriptions, semi-structured interviews, surveys and questionnaires and qualitative and quantitative analysis of logs. We are driven in terms of selecting our research methods by current questions on use of the virtual environment.

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Bruno Schulz

Posted by Elizabeth Churchill on June 3, 2005

Apropos of nothing, some information on Bruno Schulz and the Street of Crocodiles

http://www.kirjasto.sci.fi/schulz.htm
http://www.necessaryprose.com/schulz.html

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For Jef: Body and Space references

Posted by Elizabeth Churchill on June 3, 2005

We were talking about embodied action in space and the following references came to mind that may be of interest aside from de Certeau. I have not thought much about where they all fit together in terms of background theory, moivation or affiliation but that could be a nice project to engage in at some time.

References

Gurwitsch, A. (1979) Human Encounters in the Social World. Trans. by Fred Kersten. (Duquesne U. Press, Pittsburgh)

Habermas, J. (1987) The Theory of Communicative Action, vol II_. Trans. by Thomas McCarthy. (Beacon Press, Boston)

Heidegger, M. (1962) Being and Time Trans by John Macquarrie & Edward Robinson. (Harper & Row, New York)

Husserl, E. (1913). Ideas, Part I (The Hauge)

[Snippets from http://www.natcom.org/conferences/Rome/Rome%20papers/Torn.htm]

Gurwitsch’s account of social interaction utilizes three seminal concepts of phenomenology: 1) Husserl’s concept of the “natural attitude”, 2) Heidegger’s concept of “das Zeug” or “equipment”, and 3) Scheler’s concept of the “milieu.” Gurwitsch builds on these concepts to theorize an account of social interaction which locates intersubjectivity in the “natural attitude” towards a group towards shared “equipment” existing in a common context or “milieu”.

Gurwitsch shares Husserl’s program of turning philosophy towards the examination of non-philosophical phenomena; specifically, the “natural attitude” of the everyday. Like most of Husserl’s subsequent critics, however Gurwitsch criticizes Husserl’s continued commitment to the modernist project of the “phenomenology of consciousness” inaugurated by Descartes; this is shown by Husserl’s approach to the relationship between Subject and Object as an encounter between a Transcendent Ego and an objective, unchanging object. Indeed, Gurwitsch sees Descartes’ radical epistemology as the cause of Western philosophy’s break with the ‘natural attitude” in the first place, a break which has led to create the “problem of intersubjectivity”, or the philosophical doubt in the reality of other sensible beings.

Gurwitsch hopes to recreate a model of a primordial, intersubjective social understanding through including in his concept of the “natural attitude” Heidegger’s concept of “das Zeug” and Scheler’s concept of the “milieu”. By “das Zeug”, Heidegger refers to the sense that objects only reveal themselves to us through their use, through their “readiness-to-hand”. Thus a pen is not simply a pen, it is “writing equipment”. A piece of paper is not simply a piece of paper but is “equipment-to-be-written-on”. The table on which the paper is written on is “equipment-on-which-to-rest-things” and so on. The fact that each object ultimately leads in its use to another piece of equipment explains why there is no such thing as “an equipment,” why “das Zeug” is always plural. We are always dealing with a “equipment totality” (Zeugganzheit). Gurwitsch places this “equipment-totality” in a particular “milieu” which “Scheler defines . . . as the totality of what is mentally lived by a living being as effecting that living . . . in contrast to what objectively operates upon that living being.”

Gurwitsch’s identification of the milieu with the “equipment totality” contained therein allows him to define the placement of any persons together in that milieu as a collective comportment towards a shared equipment totality by a particular group. The intersubjective manner in which the group relates to their common milieu with its constitutive equipment totality defines the type of group involved. In “partnership”, a group comes together to use the equipment totality for a common purpose; once the goal is achieved, the group (and presumably its shared milieu) is abandoned. In the relationship of “fusion”, a group attempts to transcend the milieu through devotion to a charismatic leader; this acetic rejection of the equipment totality is however, doomed to failure. By taking common responsibility for shared equipment and by building a shared history and tradition around that equipment, however, a group sense of “membership” is formed; this is the most stable and productive of Gurwitsch’s defined social groups.

Through assuming Gurwitsch’s model of “membership”, we can approach a model for presenting a VR environment with an optimal level of verisimilitude. By designing interactive objects which link their functions to each other in a way that models Heidegger’ s concept of “equipment totality”, a milieu is thereby created which can express the “mental life” of the users of that environment, allowing a “natural attitude” to take place whereby users can “gear into” the milieu in a way that approaches Heidegger’s notion of “Being-in-the-World” with all the attendant interconnectiveness implied. By encountering others as enmeshed within the “equipment totality” of the milieu, an intersubjective reinforcement of the reality can then take place.

Although a model such as Gurwitsch’s “membership” helps suggest the kind of verisimilitude a virtual environment should strive for, its implementation is far from being an easy goal. For an example of the factors which could prevent such a verisimilitude from forming, let us return to Heidegger’s discussion of the “equipment-totality”.

In our encounter with the interconnectedness of the “ready-to-hand”, it is presupposed that the equipment-totality is functioning properly so that each object relates to the other objects in the way that they should. However, Heidegger lists three ways things can go wrong. First, if an object is broken, it becomes “conspicuous”. By losing its usefulness and thus losing its ability to lead us on to the next task which is always implied, the object blocks our progress with its conspicuous presence. Second, if an important object is missing, the lack of the object creates “the mode of obtrusiveness”, meaning that the absence of the desired object obtrudes on the readiness-to-hand of the other objects in the equipment totality, which cannot-be-gotten to without the object which is missing. Finally, if the desired object one wants to use is blocked trough the imposition of another undesired object with an attendant undesired task, one encounters the “obstinacy” of the ready-to-hand, which blocks, instead of hinders the desired action. According to Heidegger, such frustrations in fact force us to confront Being. “When an assignment has been disturbed . . . then the assignment becomes explicit . . . our circumspection comes up against emptiness, and we now see for the first time what the missing article was ready-to-hand with, and what it was ready to hand for. The environment announces itself afresh. In the case of CMC, however, the announcement of Being involves an understanding of the VE itself as not reality but as “equipment-to-virtualize-reality.” The result is a break in the “natural attitude” towards the VE and a dispelling of the VR illusion.

[End of snippet]

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For Jef: Deriving a Framework for Meddlings

Posted by Elizabeth Churchill on June 3, 2005

Culture jamming:

[snip from http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Culture_jamming]

Culture jamming, or sniggling, is the act of using existing mass media to comment on those very media themselves, using the original medium’s communication method. It is based on the idea that advertising is little more than propaganda for established interests, and that there is little escape from this propaganda in industrialized nations. Culture jamming’s intent differs from that of artistic appropriation (which is done for art’s sake) and vandalism (where destruction or defacement is the primary goal), although its results are not always so easily distinguishable.

The phrase “culture jamming” comes from the idea of radio jamming: that public frequencies can be pirated and subverted for independent communication, or to disrupt dominant frequencies. The Situationist International first made the comparison to radio jamming in 1968, when it proposed the use of guerrilla communication within mass media to sow confusion within the dominant culture. (Kalle Lasn, the founder of AdBusters magazine, wrote a book entitled Culture Jam, but the term predates his title.)

Culture jamming is a form of activism and a resistance movement to the perceived hegemony of popular culture, based on the ideas of “guerrilla communication” and the “detournement” of popular icons and ideas. It has roots in the German concept of spass guerilla and in the Situationist International. Forms of culture jamming include adbusting, performance art, graffiti, and hacktivism (such as cybersquatting.)

[End of snip]

Other places that talk abut culture jamming:

http://www.adbusters.org/home/
http://www.sniggle.net/index.php
http://www.abrupt.org/CJ/CJ.html

I also liked this piece on critiques of culture jamming:

[snip from http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Culture_jamming#Critique_of_Culture_Jamming]

Critique of Culture Jamming

Canadian authors Joseph Heath and Andrew Potter in 2004 released a book called The Rebel Sell: Why the Culture Can’t be Jammed, criticizing culture jamming as not only ineffective, but encouraging the very consumerism it seeks to quell. (The U.S. release of the book is called Nation of Rebels: Why Counterculture Became Consumer Culture). In a wider critique of the underlying theory of counterculture, Heath and Potter note that the capitalist system thrives not on conformity — as so many ‘culture jammers’ believe — but rather on individualism and a quest for distinction. Thus, culture jamming cannot bring down “the system” or “The Man,” because “the system” doesn’t care if you do things differently from others, and, in fact, is more than happy to accommodate you by selling you ‘non-conformist’ goods.

The book goes on to explain that consumerism comes largely from competitive consumption in an effort for distinction, and ‘rebellion’ is an excellent path to distinction. Since most goods depend on exclusivity for their value, especially goods which are said to decry mainstream life, a purchasing ‘arms race’ is created whenever others begin to follow the same tendencies: if you lag, you become mainstream. Not surprisingly, then, the image of rebelliousness or non-conformity has long been a selling point for many products, especially those that begin as ‘alternative’ products. Far from being ’subversive,’ encouraging the purchase of such products (such as Adbusters’ line of running shoes) does nothing more than turn them into ‘mainstream’ ones. This tendency is very easy to observe in music, for example.

Critically, explain Heath and Potter, most of society’s problems (and rules) are traceable to collective action problems, not traits inherent in our culture as most culture jammers believe, a mistake which leads them to attempt to disrupt the existing social order with very few results. It also allows people to wrongly claim a political element to their lifestyle preferences, or glorify criminality as a form of dissent.

The book recommends a simple legislative solution to problems such as consumerism, for example, through eliminating tax deductions for advertising. The authors also point, however, to the counterculture’s tendency to reject so-called ‘institutional’ solutions, a mistake which merely invites the problem to remain.

[End of snip]

And I think the item below really expresses somethings of interest to our conversation.
This is an interesting way in which the use of the term “culture jamming” can be seen to sit on a continuum from small acts (denouements of which we talked today) to explicit activism. I liked this discussion as it picks up the work of Hebidge - I liked his book on Subcultures very much. I have asterisked the pieces I think may be of interest as a framework for positioning work like that Eric and friends do in what I have decided to call our “Framework for Meddlings”.

[snip from http://www.georgetown.edu/faculty/irvinem/theory/Theory-KeyTerms.html]

In the “Cultural Studies” model, “culture” is a field of conflicting and competing forces resulting from structured asymmetries in power, capital, and value.

Cultural Studies as an academic field has been accused of dematerializing or leveling media content in order to objectify ideological and political messages for analysis. The approach is often further characterized as an “effects” model of analysis that focuses on capitalist and corporate mechanisms of control and usually omits the agency and activity of individuals, groups, and subcultures who are the receivers and users of media.

Stuart Hall’s “cultural marxism” approach builds out a more complex model based on extending the theory of hegemony, the social-economic processes for “manufacturing consent” among the lower classes (the “have-nots” or “have-lesses”) to buy-in to the view promoted by ownership classes (”the haves”).

In this view of cultural studies, mass media and communications typically encode (implicitly presuppose as a context for meaning) a dominant ideology which finds mass acceptance. Media is thus ideologically encoded to maximize the willing consent of the consumer and “have-nots” to “keep with the program” and perpetuate the status quo of power and wealth distribution.

Hegemony of ideologies that protect the governing and ownership class is not a matter of force, coercion, or obvious deliberate manipulation. It functions so well because it relies on the willing consent of those with less power and wealth to accept a dominant ideology, to see the world and act according the view of those above.

Examples of mainstream ideologies that circulate in the media and protect hegemonic power:

* Free speech (as a belief, when few have power in what they voice)
* Individuality (great for marketing, since consumerism requires the simultaneous presentation of unique personal choices and identities and the need to look and buy like everyone else in an identity group)
* Freedom of choice (part of our individuality beliefs, also the main assumption in consumer culture and marketing: the ideology of the shopping mall)

In this view of hegemony and culture, social behavior is overdetermined by multiple identity factors like race, social class, sex and gender, and nationality, which are encoded in hierarchies of power, significance, and economic value.

But Hall and others like Dick Hebidge show that people have many strategies for dealing with media contents: ***operate in the dominant code, use a negotiable code (accepts but modifies the meaning based on the viewer’s and viewer communities position), or substitute an oppositional code (using critical awareness, demystification, irony, subversion, play, parody, like DJ sampling)***. In this way, many subcultures are formed around group uses of media, images, and music that create identities and differentiations from mainstream or dominant culture.

[end of snip]

A snippet on resistence and acceptance:

Gramsci used the term hegemony to denote the predominance of one social class over others (e.g. bourgeois hegemony). This represents not only political and economic control, but also the ability of the dominant class to project its own way of seeing the world so that those who are subordinated by it accept it as ‘common sense’ and ‘natural’. Commentators stress that this involves willing and active consent. Common sense, suggests Geoffrey Nowell-Smith, is ‘the way a subordinate class lives its subordination’ (cited in Alvarado & Boyd-Barrett 1992: 51).

However, unlike Althusser, Gramsci emphasizes struggle. He noted that ‘common sense is not something rigid and immobile, but is continually transforming itself’ (Gramsci, cited in Hall 1982: 73). As Fiske puts it, ‘Consent must be constantly won and rewon, for people’s material social experience constantly reminds them of the disadvantages of subordination and thus poses a threat to the dominant class… Hegemony… posits a constant contradiction between ideology and the social experience of the subordinate that makes this interface into an inevitable site of ideological struggle’ (Fiske 1992: 291). References to the mass media in terms of an ideological ’site of struggle’ are recurrent in the commentaries of those influenced by this perspective. Gramsci’s stance involved a rejection of economism since it saw a struggle for ideological hegemony as a primary factor in radical change.

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